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NOTE 
HIDING BEHIND POLICY: 
CONFUSING COMPENSATION 
WITH INDEMNIFICATION 
[l]t seems only fair that if, in fact, the insurance company has, 
by wrongfully refusing to settle, caused the insured to incur 
substantial damages, it should be the company, not the insured, 
that should ultimately be responsible. To conclude otherwise is 
to say that the insurer should not be responsible for the damage 
it has caused because the amount of the damage it caused was 
1 
so great. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance CO., 2 the 
California Supreme Court held that an insurer may not in-
demnify its insured for a punitive damages judgment in a third 
party action.3 Even if the excess judgment is the result of the 
insurer's bad faith breach of its duty to settle a third party ac-
tion on behalf of its insured, an insured may not recover if it 
seeks compensatory damages that include a punitive damages 
1 
ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 5.12, at 325 (3d ed. 1995 & 
Supp. 1999). 
2 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999). 
3 . See ill. at 658. 
637 
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judgment.' The California Supreme Court found that to con-
clude otherwise would violate California's long established 
public policy precluding indemnification of punitive damages.5 
This Note examines the faulty reasoning in the California 
Supreme Court's decision. Part II briefly discusses relevant 
principles of insurance law. Part III outlines the facts under-
lying PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., in-
cluding the initial Colorado lawsuit that evolved into the case 
ultimately presented to the California Supreme Court. Part IV 
explains the procedural history of the case, including the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal's opinion and PPG Industries, Inc.'s ap-
peal to the California Supreme Court. Part V details the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's analysis and its focus on California's 
public policy against indemnification of punitive damages. 
Part VI discusses Justice Mosk's heated dissent and his oppo-
sition to what he viewed as the majority's apparent favoritism 
of insurers. Finally, Part VII criticizes the California Supreme 
Court for ignoring PPG Industries, Inc.'s allegations that it 
was entitled to recover consequential damages arising from 
Transamerica's bad faith failure to settle a third party claim, 
thereby setting a precedent that allows insurers to escape li-
ability for their own tortious conduct. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The relationship between an insurer and its insured has 
evolved into one that centers on good faith and fair dealing.6 
Since 1882, courts have recognized the existence of a special 
relationship between an insurer and its insured, "empha-
siz[ing] that the relationship was built on mutual confidence 
and ... that a spirit of good faith and fair dealing between the 
parties should mark every insurance contract . .,7 Courts 
stressed the importance of this relationship as they expanded 
4 • See id. 
5 See id. 
6 
See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.02, at 1· 
7 (1999). 
7 [d. (citing Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig & Co., 80 Ky. 223 (1882». 
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an insurer's contractual legal responsibilities to its insured 
beyond those ordinarily imposed on parties involved in private 
contracts.8 They have reasoned that such an expansion is nec-
essary due to the adhesive nature of standardized insurance 
contracts and the unequal bargaining power created by them.9 
Further, the public nature of the insurance industry and the 
insured's reliance on the loss protection of the policy have 
proved to be compelling reasons for courts to hold insurers to a 
higher standard of conduct. 10 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURER-INSURED RELATIONSHIP 
Historically, the relationship between an insurer and its 
insured was considered equivalent to the relationship between 
a debtor and a creditor or, stated more simply, "one contracting 
party to another contracting party.,,11 However, with the ad-
vent of the judicially created implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, which provides that an insurer will not in-
fringe upon the insured's right to recover under the terms of its 
policy, courts have begun to recognize the existence of a fiduci-
ary relationship.12 In 1980, in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha In-
surance CO.,13 the California Supreme Court noted: 
s See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 1-8. 
9 See ill. 
10 See ill. (citing Healy Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1977); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452 (Cal. 1979); and 
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967». 
11 [d. § 1.05, at 1-14 (citing COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 23.11, at 11 
(2d ed. 1960». 
12 See ill. A fiduciary is defined as a "person holding the character of a trustee, or a 
character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved 
in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. A person having a 
duty, created by this undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters 
connected with such undertaking .... " BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). 
California's jury instructions define a fiduciary relationship as existing "whenever 
under the circumstances trust and confidence reasonably may be and is reposed by one 
person in the integrity and fidelity of another." CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
CML (BAJI) 12.36 (6th ed. 1977). 
13 598 P.2d 452 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (holding that the relation-
ship between an insurer and its insured is that ofa fiduciary). 
3
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[A]s a supplier of a public service rather than a 
manufactured product, the obligations of in-
surers go beyond meeting reasonable expecta-
tions of coverage. The obligations of good faith 
and fair dealing encompass qualities of de-
cency and humanity inherent in the responsi-
bilities of a fiduciary. Insurers hold them-
selves out as fiduciaries, and with the public 
trust must go private responsibility consonant 
with that trust. 14 
It is important to recognize, however, tpat in many jurisdic-
tions a fiduciary relationship between an insurer and an in-
sured is not created until the insurer assumes the defense. IS 
In other words, in those jurisdictions the "mere existence of the 
insurer-insured relationship" does not thereby impose a fiduci-
d t . ~ ary u y upon an msurer. 
As courts continued to define the realm of the insurer-
insured relationship, they also worked diligently to develop 
tort law. 17 Tort law became frequently utilized by courts in 
insurance disputes, eventually developing into four theories of 
recovery applied in insurance law. IS One of the most common 
recognized theories of recovery is an insured's breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.19 
14 
Id. (quoting Goodman & Seaton, Forward: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings 
and Current Concerns of the California Supreme Court, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 309, 346-347 
(1974». 
15 See, e.g. Kosce v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 377 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1977) (holding that an insurer's fiduciary duty does not extend to refusal to de-
fend a third party action against its insured). 
16 Id. 
17 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.06, at 1-16 to 1-17. 
IS See id at 1-17. 
19 See id. The other tort theories of recovery that have been utilized by courts in 
insurance disputes are fraud, intentional infliction of mental distress, and tortious 
interference with a protected property interest. See id. (citing DOBBS, LAw OF 
REMEDIES § 6.12 (2d ed. 1993». This note will not discuss these theories, but will 
4
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B. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GoOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, inher-
ent in every contract, posits "that neither party will do any-
thing to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of 
the agreement. "20 Insurance policies are included among the 
contracts subject to this implied covenant.21 Although it is the 
contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured 
that implicates the duty of good faith and fair dealing, many 
jurisdictions have also recognized the existence of an extracon-
tractual duty owed by the insurer in fulfilling its obligations 
under the policy in good faith.22 These jurisdictions have used 
the implied covenant "as a basis for defining the duty owed by 
the insurer to the insured, and have concluded the action is 
one in tort."23 For example, the California Supreme Court held 
in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance CO. 24 that the duty imposed on 
the insurer by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
independent of the performance required under the terms of 
the contract.25 Thus; the court reasoned that the mere exis-
tence of a contract does not shield an insurer from liability for 
the torts it commits when it interferes with an insured's right 
to receive "the benefits of the agreement. "26 In jurisdictions 
that have similarly found an extracontractual duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, an insurer's breach of the duty may be 
subject to either or both the law of torts and/or contracts.27 
instead focus on an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
20 [d. § 2.01, at 2-1. 
21 See id. at 2-1 to 2-2. See also Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 
(Cal. 1958). 
22 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-3 (citing Johnsen v. California State 
Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 
510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973». 
23 JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAw IN A NUTSHELL, at 309 (3d ed. 1996). 
24 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
25 See id. 
26 [d. 
27 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-4 (citing Frazier v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 214 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1985) (finding that plaintiff was allowed to choose be-
tween tort and contract causes of action». 
5
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Some jurisdictions, however, have yet to impose tort liability 
upon an insurer for breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, despite the national trend to do SO.28 
Eventually, judicial recognition of the special relationship 
created between the parties to an insurance contract resulted 
in the tort of bad faith.29 Essentially, an insurer's breach of the 
covenant constitutes bad faith, thereby entitling the insured to 
restitution or to recover any damages incurred.8o A majority of 
jurisdictions have held an insurer liable in third party actions 
for breaching the duty required by the covenant.81 A growing 
number of jurisdictions are expanding this liability to first 
party actions as well.32 Generally, to recover in a tort action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, an insured must demonstrate that "the insurer had a duty 
to the insured, the insurer breached that duty, and the insured 
suffered damage as a proximate result of the breach."sa An 
insurer may defend itself against such a claim by demonstrat-
ing that the underlying claim is not covered by the policy, or 
that a contract either does not exist or is voidable.34 
C. AN INSURER'S DUTY TO SETTLE 
28 See id. § 2.02, at 2-5. See, e.g., Gordon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 285 
N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972). The categorization of a cause of action for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as either contract or tort "has not 
appeared to affect the remedies available against the insurer, [however] it does deter-
mine which of the two statute of limitations is to be applied." DOBBYN, supra note 23, 
at 309. Generally, "the primary differences in characterizing an action as one in tort 
rather than contract are: the statute of limitations that will fix the time within which 
the action must be brought; the nature of the conduct that will prove the breach; and 
the type of damages that can be recovered." 2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE 
PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION § 24.3, at 24-6 (Bob Pickus, et al. eds. 1999). 
29 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 1.08, at 1-31 to 1-38. 
30 See id. § 2.01, at 2-2. See, e.g., Comunsle v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 
198 (Cal. 1958). 
31 S id ee . 
32 See SHERNOFF, supra note 6, § 2.01, at 2-2. 
33 
2 CALIFORNIA LIABILITY INSURANCE PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION § 24.25, at 
24-20 (Bob Pickus et al. eds. 1999). 
34 . See id. § 24.48, at 24-37 to 24-38. 
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An insurer's duty to settle actions pending against its in-
sured is implied in the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.35 This duty is owed solely to the insured.36 As such, 
only the insured has standing to sue the insurer for a breach,s7 
which typically occurs when an insurer fails "to accept a rea-
sonable settlement offer within policy limits.,,38 Once an in-
surer's breach is proven, the insured is entitled to recover "the 
full amount of the underlying judgment, including the amount 
exceeding the policy limits, and for any other consequential 
damages suffered by the insured, such as damages for emo-
tional distress.,,39 Upon a showing that the insurer's conduct in 
failing to settle was oppressive or fraudulent, the insured may 
also be entitled to recover punitive damages.40 However, even 
if an insurer is not liable for failing to accept a reasonable set-
tlement offer, its overall conduct during settlement negotia-
tions may still amount to a bad faith breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 41 More importantly, an 
insurer does not have to actually act in bad faith to breach its 
duty to settle.42 Rather, an insured must only sh~w that the 
insurer failed to settle a claim "that it would have settled had 
it treated the claim as if [it] alone would be liable for the entire 
potential verdict.,,43 
35 See id. § 26.2, at 26-3 (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co" 328 P.2d 198, 
201 (Cal. 1958». 
36 See id. § 26.3, at 26-3. 
37 See id. It is important to note that anyone who has "acquir[ed] the insured's 
rights against the insurer" also has "standing to sue the insurer for breach of the duty 
to settle." For example, "a third party claimant commonly acquires the insured's right 
to sue through an assignment. The assignment does not change the basic nature of 
the action as one that must be evaluated exclusively in terms of the insured's rights." 
ld. 
3S 
PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.4 at 26-3 to 26-4. 
39 1d. 
40 See id. § 26.35, at 26-2l. 
41 See id. § 26.5, at 26-4. 
42 
See WINDT, supra note 1, § 5.12, at 323. 
43 1d. 
7
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. It is important to recognize that an insurer's duty to settle 
arises only when the policy covers the loss claimed in a third 
party action.44 Once this duty arises, an insurer is obligated by 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to settle a third 
party action against its insured "when there is a great risk of a 
recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable 
manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be 
made within those limits.,,45 Although an insurer's duty is 
usually triggered by a settlement offer that is within policy 
limits, "case law suggests that any settlement offer triggers the 
insurer's duty of good faith to its insured and requires the in-
surer at least to explore the offer.n46 Thus, as part of its duties 
implied in the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an in-
surer is obligated to give, at a minimum, equal weight to the 
insured's and its own interests.47 
At the point that the insurer unreasonably refuses to settle, 
the breach occurs.48 However, the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run "until the insured suffers a binding judgment 
in excess of the policy limits and damages can be 
ascertained."'9 As previously stated, an insured may bring an 
action against its insurer for failure to settle under either a 
contract theory or a negligence theory, depending on the juris-
diction. 50 Although the statute of limitations is longer for con-
tract actions, an insured that chooses to sue in contract may 
lose its right to recover punitive damages. 51 In pleading an 
44 See PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.18, at 26-9 (citing Heredia v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 279 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991); Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 
1981), Merrit v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973); Tan Jay Int'l v. Canadian 
Indem Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1988); and Continental Cas. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 268 
Cal. Rptr. 193 (1990». 
45 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958). 
46 
PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.14, at 26-8. 
47 See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201. 
48 See PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.12, at 26-7. 
49 d [, . 
50 See id. at § 26.11, at 26-7. 
51 See id. The statute of limitations for an action based on a written contract is four 
years after the action accrues. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (Deering 1999). There 
8
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action for negligent failure to settle, the applicable standard is 
"whether a prudent insurer, without policy limits, would have 
accepted the offer. »52 To successfully prove a cause of action for 
failure to settle, the insured must show: first, the insurer had 
a contractual duty to "indemnify the insured for loss resulting 
from the underlying claim;" second, the insurer had "a duty to 
settle the claim within policy limits;" third, the insurer 
breached its duty by "either refusing a reasonable settlement 
offer within policy limits or failing to explore settlement within 
the policy limits on a conditional offer;" and fourth, the in-
surer's breach proximately caused the insured's damage.53 
D. INDEMNIFICATION OF PuNITIVE DAMAGES 
1. California: A Policy Against Indemnification 
California has long had a public policy prohibiting indemni-
fication by an insurer of a punitive damages judgment against 
its insured.54 California Civil Code section 1668 states that 
any contract which seeks to exempt an individual "from re-
sponsibility for his own fraud or willful injury 
to ... another ... [is] against the policy of law.»55 Additionally, 
California Insurance Code section 533 specifically bars insurer 
liability "for the willful act of the insured. »56 Thus, because 
punitive damages are recoverable only when a wrongdoer has 
is an exception to title insurance policies that have a two year statute of limitations. 
See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 339 (1) (Deering 1999). Actions based on an oral contract 
have a two year statute of limitations. See ill. There are several tort statutes oflimi-
tation which are applicable to actions based on an insurer's breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "The nature of the right sued on, and not the 
nature of the remedy sought, determines which of the various tort statutes of limita-
tion" will apply. PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 24.18 at 24-15 (citing Purdy v. Pacific 
Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 537 (1984». 
52 PICKUS, ET AL., supra note 32, § 26.6, at 26-5. The standard is the same whether 
the action is pleaded in contract or in tort. See ill. 
63 [d. § 26.13, at 26-7 to 26-8. 
54 See JUSTICE H. WALTER CROSKY, ET AL, CALIFORmA PRACTICE GUIDE, INSURANCE 
LITIGATION § 7:343 (1995). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). 
55 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (Deering 1999). 
55 CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). 
9
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acted with "malice, fraud or oppression,n57 which by their na-
ture are willful acts, section 533 effectively prohibits indemni-
fication of punitive damages arising out of a third party law-
suit.58 The policy's rationale centers on the notion that an in-
sured should not be allowed to pass on to its insurer liability to 
a third party arising from its intentional conduct. 59 Thus, even 
if an insurance policy does not specifically exclude an insured's 
claim for such damages, the public policy prohibition is im-
plied.so 
2. Other States Not Subject to California Public Policy 
Although California has a strong public policy prohibiting 
indemnification of punitive damages, out-of-state punitive 
damage awards may not be subject to its policy.6t Currently, 
jurisdictions differ regarding the insurability of punitive dam-
ages.62 In jurisdictions that prohibit indemnification, such as 
California, punitive damages are allowed only in instances of 
egregious conduct and for the sole (purpose of punishing and 
deterring the conduct.63 These jurisdictions believe that in-
suring such conduct would undermine this policy.64 On the 
other hand, jurisdictions that allow indemnity tend to award 
punitive damages at lower thresholds, such as "gross negli-
gence or reckless and wanton conduct."eo These jurisdictions 
often recognize the unfairness of not indemnifying an insured 
67 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1999). 
68 See CROSKY, ET AL, supra note 54, § 7:345. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 533 
(Deering 1999). 
69 See id. at § 7:343 (quoting City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr 
494, 496 (1979». 
60 See id. at §.7:344 (quoting Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810-
811 (1985». 
61 
See id. at § 7:346 (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Fireboard Corp., 762 F.Supp. 
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aft'd without published opn., 953 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1992». 
62 See, e.g., City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1979). 
63 
See City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1979). 
64 See id. 
66 1d. 
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"who might well be ruined financially by a judgment for puni-
tive damages as the re'sult of conduct of no more flagrancy 
than an act of 'gross negligence,' a monetary 'reckless' act, or 
conduct 'contrary to social interests.',,&6 Thus, California's 
public' policy against indemnification of punitive damages 
would not necessarily preclude coverage of a judgment against 
a California insured for an out-of-state award of punitive dam-
ages.67 Although California has an interest in awarding puni-
tive damages to punish and deter misconduct by its own citi-
zens, it does not have an interest in deterring conduct in other 
states.68 Thus, when a plaintiff in another state is awarded 
punitive damages for a defendant's reckless or wanton conduct, 
as opposed to malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, 
California's anti-indemnification policy may not apply.69 In 
such circumstances, the insurer is obligated to pay the judg-
ment under the terms of the ,policy. 70 
III. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. v. TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CO. 
In 1987, PPG Industries, Inc. ("PPG") became the successor 
in interest to Solaglas California, Inc. ("Solaglas"), which dis-
tributed and installed replacement windshields in cars and 
trucks.71 Upon doing so, PPG became financially liable for a 
Colorado judgment against Solaglas that exceeded Solaglas' 
insurance policy limits. 72 Prior to trial in the underlying law-
66 [d. (quoting Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1921 (Or. 1977». 
67 
See EUGENE R. ANDERSON, ET AL., INSURANCE LITIGATION CoVERAGE § 8.01, at 8-
3 to 8-4 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing application of New York's public policy against in-
demnification of punitive damages to out-of-state awards). 
68 See Zimmerman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 224 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1986). 
69 See CROSKY, ET AL., supra note 54, § 7:346 (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Fire-
board Corp., 762 F.Supp. 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd without published opn., 953 F.2d 
1386 (9th Cir. 1992). 70 See ANDERSON, ET AL., supra note 67, § 8.01, at 8-4. 
71 
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889,891 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1996). 72 
See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (No. S056618). 
11
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suit, Solaglas' insurer, Transamerica Insurance Company 
("Trans america"), refused several settlement offers that were 
within policy limits despite Solaglas' high risk of suffering an 
excess judgment.73 The trial ultimately resulted in a one mil-
lion dollar punitive damages judgment against Solaglas.74 PPG 
sued Transamerica in California, claiming that as Solaglas' 
insurer, Transamerica breached its duty to settle inherent in 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.75 
A. THE FACTS THAT INSTIGATED A THIRD PARTY LAWSUIT 
AGAINST SOLAGLAS 
On April 18, 1980, an acquaintance ("Buyer") of George 
Miller, the injured party, purchased a 1980 General Motors 
Corporation ("GMC") light-duty pickup truck from a dealer.76 
Several days after the purchase, Buyer "returned to the dealer 
to have a crack in the truck's windshield repaired.,,77 As was 
its practice, the dealer sent the warranty windshield repair 
order to Solaglas.78 Pursuant to the dealer's request, Solaglas 
installed a replacement windshield. 79 Despite specifications in 
GMC manuals, industry publications, and safety regulation 
requirements, Solaglas installed the windshield without a ure-
thane sea1.80 Typically, windshields installed without urethane 
seals require about thirty minutes of labor. 81 Evidence showed, 
however, that Solaglas charged for 2.8 hours of labor to install 
the windshield without a urethane seal.82 
73 See id. 
74 
See id. 
75 
See PPG Indu8., Inc. v. Tran8america Ina. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999). 
76 See Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 562 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). 
The court did not identify the buyer of the truck. . 
77 d l< • 
78 See id. 
79 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
80 
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
81 
See id. 
82 
See id. 
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On July 17, 1983, Buyer loaned the truck to George Miller.83 
While Miller was driving, he approached an intersection at 
which the traffic lights were out of order.54 Miller slowed 
down, but did not stop, and continued to enter the 
intersection. 85 The truck was struck from behind by another 
vehicle.86 As a result of the impact, the truck was forced onto a 
curb at the corner of the intersection and collided into a metal 
light pole.87 At some point during the collision, the truck's 
windshield "popped out,,86 and Miller, who was not wearing a 
seat belt, was thrown through the windshield opening.89 The 
collision instantly rendered Miller a quadriplegic.90 Miller sub-
sequently filed suit against Solaglas in Colorado.91 In 1987, 
PPG purchased stock in Solaglas, thus becoming its successor 
in interest and a defendant in Miller's lawsuit.92 
B. MILLER v. SOLAGLAS: ROUND ONE93 
In 1983, Miller sued GMC, Solaglas, and the truck dealer, 
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages for negli-
gence and strict liability.94 GMC and the dealer each settled 
with Miller during the first trial, leaving Solaglas as the sole 
83 See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
54 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
87 See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
86 PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
89 See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
90 See id. 
91 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
92 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. A successor in interest is "one who follows an-
other in ownership or control of property.. .. In the case of corporations, the term 
ordinarily indicates statutory succession as, for instance, when a corporation changes 
its name but retains same property." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY at 1431-1432 (6th ed. 
1990). 
93 870 P.2d 559 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). 
94 See id. at 562. 
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defendant.95 At the time of the incident, Solaglas was covered 
by several insurance polices.96 Two of the polices were issued 
to Solaglas by its liability insurance carrier, Transamerica, and 
had a combined coverage totaling $1.5 million per occurrence.97 
Solaglas also carried a nine million dollar excess liability in-
surance policy issued by Industrial Indemnity Company.98 
Solaglas tendered the defense to Transamerica, giving timely 
notice ofthe lawsuit.99 Upon agreeing to provide the defense in 
the Miller action, Transamerica informed Solaglas that neither 
of its Transamerica insurance policies provided coverage for 
any punitive damages awarded against it.1°O Under a reserva-
tion of rights, Transamerica appointed independent counsel to 
defend Solaglas.101 
Although settlement negotiations began early in the proc-
ess, all attempts to settle the lawsuit between Miller and Sola-
glas proved unsuccessful. 102 Miller offered to settle the case for 
$1.5 million, the total coverage provideq by the Transamerica 
policies. lOS However, Transamerica refused to offer more that 
$250,000, despite independent counsel's recommendation that 
95 See id. The court did not specify what amounts GMC and the truck dealer set-
tled for. 
96 
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
97 
See id. 
98 
See id. Excess insurance policies cover "the excess above and beyond that which 
may be collected on other insurance." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY at 562 (6th ed. 1990). 
99 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
100 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
101 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. A reservation of rights notice "is a unilateral 
statement by the insurer in writing notifying the insured of the insurer's intention to 
continue with the defense while retaining the right to press all issues that could lead 
to a finding of noncoverage. The primary purpose of the notice is to make the in-
sured aware of the insurer's full intentions so that the insured cannot later claim that 
the insurer waived its rights to claim noncoverage or is estopped to make such a claim 
because the insured was misled into believing that the insurer had accepted liability 
on the policy. Such notice is also intended to make the insured aware of the fact that 
the insurer may decide to withdraw from the defense of the tort action at any time, 
and, therefore, the insured would be well advised to hire his own attorney and conduct 
his own investigation." DOBBYN, see supra note 23, at 309. 
102 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
103 
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
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Transamerica offer Miller at least $750,000 to settle the case. 104 
With settlement negotiations having failed, the case was tried 
before a jury in 1986.105 The trial court dismissed Miller's 
claim for punitive damages and failed to instruct the jury on 
Miller's strict liability claim. l06 Thereafter, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Solaglas. l07 The jury found that Solaglas did 
in fact act negligently, but that its negligence did not cause 
Miller's injuries. 108 Miller appealed to the Colorado Court of 
AppealslO9 which reversed the jury's verdict and remanded the 
case "for a new trial on all issues. "110 
Prior to the second trial in January 1991, Miller again of-
fered to settle with PPG, which had since become the successor 
in interest to Solaglas, reducing his demand to one million 
dollars. lll Again, Transamerica rejected Miller's demand and 
subsequently reduced it own settlement offer to $100,000.112 
On at least four separate occasions throughout settlement ne-
gotiations, PPG demanded that Transamerica settle within the 
policy limits.11s Each time, Transamerica denied PPG's 
request114 despite damaging deposition testimony presented by 
one of PPG's experts and a trial court ruling that Miller had 
"made the prima facie showing necessary to discover financial 
information related to his punitive damages claim. "115 
104 S id ee . 
105 . See ,d. 
106 S id ee . 
107 
See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
108 S id ee . 
109 See Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., No. 86CA1213 (Colo. Ct. App. September 
8, 1988). Miller "did not appeal the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on his 
strict liability claim." Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
110 
Miller, 870 P.2d at 562 (citing Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc., No. 86CA1213 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993». 
111 
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l. 
112S id ee . 
113 • • . See PetitIoner's Bnef, supra note 72, at 4. See also PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l. 
114 . 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. 
115 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4. 
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C. MILLER V. SOLAGLAS: ROUND Two 
The second trial resulted in a jury verdict against Solaglas 
and PPG, finding both entities negligent and strictly liable for 
Miller's injuries.116 The jury did not find any comparative neg-
ligence on Miller's part and, thus, awarded him $5.1 million in 
compensatory damages, which included "$2.6 million for eco-
nomic damages" and "$2.5 million for mental pain and suffer-
ing.,,1l7 The jury also awarded one million dollars in punitive 
damages, which was primarily awarded based on Solaglas' 
failure to use urethane seals during the installation of the 
windshield, yet charging Miller for the labor hours that would 
have been required had urethane seals been used. 118 Before 
entering the final judgment, however, the trial court offset the 
jury award by the amount of Miller's prior settlements with 
GMC and the truck dealer, and then added prejudgment inter-
est to the resulting sum. 119 
Solaglas appealed the final judgment to the Colorado Court 
of Appeals, and Miller cross-appealed the trial court's calcula-
tion of the prejudgment interest. 12O Solaglas contended that 
there was no evidence to support the one million dollar puni-
Iffi . 
See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89l. 
117 • M,ller, 870 P.2d at 562. See also PPG, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
118 S id ee . 
119 
See Miller, 870 P.2d at 562. 
120 
See id. Since PPG's suit against Transamerica concerned the jury's award of 
punitive damages, see PPG, 975 P.2d 652, this note will only discuss that aspect of the 
decision rendered by the Colorado Court of Appeals. In sum, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals held that: (1) defendants waived their right to assert a defense of res judicata 
by failing to set forth the defense in their answer to plaintiffs complaint; (2) the jury 
could have found that Solaglas was a manufacturer for purposes of Miller's products 
liability claim; (3) the jury could have found that Miller's negligence in failing to stop 
at the intersection did not proximately cause the accident and that Miller's injuries 
would have occurred despite his negligence; (4) the trial court's admission of safety 
codes and standards was not reversible error; (5) evidence presented by Miller war-
ranted award of exemplary damages; (6) the trial court's admission of video deposition 
testimony was not reversible error; and (7) the trial court correctly· offset the jury 
award by the amount of the settlements with GMC and the truck dealer before adding 
prejudgment interest. See id. at 559. 
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tive damages award. ~21 The Court of Appeals disagreed, recog-
nizing that juries have the authority to award "reasonable ex-
emplary damages" in any case "in which damages are assessed 
and the injury complained of is attended by circumstances of 
fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct."122 Thus, a plain-
tiff need only show beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct 
causing the injury was done so "with an evil intent" to injure 
the plaintiff, "or with such wanton and reckless disregard of 
the plaintiffs rights as to demonstrate a wrongful motive."l23 
The Court of Appeals determined that Miller presented suf-
ficient evidence demonstrating that after thirty years of expe-
rience in glass replacement, Solaglas deliberately made it 
standard practice to install replacement windshields with sili-
cone instead of urethane. l24 Solaglas followed this policy "de-
spite a- GMC manual requiring the use of urethane . . . , de-
spite a NAGS Calculator parts list and price guide indicating 
that urethane could be required ... , despite industry publica-
tions and conventions discussing the use of urethane, and de-
spite industry safety standards requiring the use of 
urethane. "126 Miller further provided evidence that Solaglas 
instructed its stores to charge for 2.8 hours of labor for the in-
stallations of windshields without a urethane seal even though 
such installation only required thirty minutes. 126 In affirming 
the verdict, the court concluded that a jury could have found 
121 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 654. Specifically, defendants argued that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding that Miller "proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Solaglas' conduct warranted the jury's award of $1 
million in exemplary damages." Miller, 870 P.2d at 568. 
122 Miller, 870 P.2d at 568 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (1987». 
123 [d. (citing Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985) 
and Frick v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1979». The Colorado Court of Appeals defined 
"wanton and reckless conduct" as "conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm to 
another and is purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk in disregard of 
the consequences." Miller, 870 P.2d at 668 (citing Tri-Aspen Construction Co. v. John-
son, 714 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1986); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); 
and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1)(b) (1987». 124 See Miller, 870 P.2d at 569. 
126 [d. 
126 S id ee . 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Solaglas purposely performed 
the installation of the windshield without the urethane seals 
with disregard for the consequences of its actions, aware that 
such conduct "created a substantial risk of harm to others. ,,127 
PPG appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court. While its 
appeal was pending, however, Miller offered to settle the case 
for $4,500,000.128 Again, Transamerica refused to accept 
Miller's offer. 129 After the Colorado Supreme Court denied 
PPG's petition for certiori in 1994, Transamerica paid $1.5 
million, its combined policy limit, towards the $5.1 million jury 
verdict, and $1,277,094.88 for Miller's costs and interest ac-
crued on the judgment. ISO Industrial Indemnity, PPG's excess 
carrier, paid the remaining $3.6 million in compensatory dam-
ages under Solaglas' excess liability coverage. l3l PPG, as Sola-
glas' successor in interest, was left to pay the one million dol-
lars in punitive damages awarded to Miller. ls2 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In June 1994, PPG sued Transamerica in California alleg-
ing that Transamerica breached the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing implied in its policies. 133 PPG argued that Trans-
america breached the covenant by refusing to settle the Miller 
action, despite requests by Solaglas and PPG to do SO.l34 Thus, 
Transamerica was required to compensate PPG for the one 
127 [d. The Colorado Court of Appeals denied Miller's claim that the trial court 
"erred in calculating prejudgment interest" since the court had previously held that 
settlement proceeds "be deducted before adding statutory interest." [d. at 571 (citing 
McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989». 
128 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4. 
129 S id ee . 
130 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891. 
131 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. 
132 See id. None of the decisions explain the extent of Industrial Indemnity's in-
volvement in the settlement negotiations. 
133 
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999). 
134 S ·d ee l • 
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million dollars in punitive damages that it was ordered to pay 
. h M'll t' 135 m tel er ac Ion. 
In October 1994, Transamerica filed a motion for summary 
judgment, claiming that it was not obligated to indemnify PPG 
for the punitive damages awarded in the Miller lawsuit. ls6 
Transamerica based its claim on the principle that an insurer 
is not responsible for indemnifying an insured for a punitive 
damages judgment, even if the insurer was unreasonable in its 
failure to settle the case within the coverage policy limits. 137 In 
September 1995, the trial court granted Transamerica's motion 
for summary judgment.l38 PPG appealed.139 
The sole issue presented to the California Court of Appeal 
was "whether consequential damages for breach of an insurer's 
duty to reasonably settle a third party action can include puni-
tive damages imposed against the insured in the third party 
action. "140 The court noted that California's public policy al-
lows a plaintiff to recover punitive damages only to punish a 
defendant for fraudulent or malicious conduct, and thereby use 
the defendant as an example to deter similar future conduct. 141 
Allowing a defendant to be indemnified by its insurer for a pu-
nitive damages judgment would frustrate this policy by re-
moving both the punishment and the threat of future punish-
ment.142 This rationale applies, the court continued, even when 
135 S id ee . 
136 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1996). 
137 See id. 
138 S id ee . 
139 See id. 
140 ld. 
141 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892 (citing City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity 
Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979». 
142 See id. The Court of Appeal further noted that "public policy would likewise be 
frustrated by indemnification of punitive damages assessed against a successor corpo-
ration for the wrongful conduct of its predecessor. Indeed, were indemnification al-
lowed when a successor corporation is liable for punitive damages due to the conduct 
of its prede.cessor, public policy could easily be frustrated by a restructuring of any 
corporation facing the imposition of punitive damages." ld. 
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the insured seeks to "pass on" the punitive damages to the in-
surer based on the insurer's "unreasonable refusal to settle."l43 
The court recognized that in some instances, the insurer's 
refusal to settle may rise to the same level of culpability as 
that of the insured. l44 AS such, the insurer can be held liable 
for bad faith to its insured for punitive damages. l46 However, 
even if the insurer's conduct in refusing to settle justifies a pu-
nitive damages award, the insured cannot avoid punishment 
for its own conduct by passing on its liability for punitive dam-
ages to its insurer. l46 To do so would violate public policy.147 
Thus, the court concluded that although there would have been 
no punitive damages award had Transamerica settled within 
its policy limits in the Miller action, Solaglas' conduct in in-
stalling the windshield was also a cause of the award. l48 Ac-
cordingly, as a matter of public policy, the Court of Appeal con-
cluded that PPG, as successor in interest, was financially re-
sponsible for the punitive damages awarded against Solaglas 
in the Miller action.149 PPG subsequently petitioned the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court for review. l50 
V. THEMAJORITY'SANALYSIS 
The California Supreme Court granted PPG's petition for 
review on December 18, 1996.151 The main issue presented to 
143 [d. at 896. 
144 
See id. 
145 S 'd ee, . 
146 See PPG, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896. 
147 
See id. 
148 See id. PPG argued that since "the punitive damages would not have been 
awarded had Transamerica accepted a settlement within policy limits," the punitive 
damages were "akin to any other damages which may arise as a consequence of an 
insurer's breach of the duty of good faith." [d. 149 
See id. at 896-97. 
150 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. 
151 
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999). 
See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Lawyer's Mutual Insurance Company In Support of 
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the court was whether an insured can sue its insurer for com-
pensatory damages in an amount equal to a punitive damages 
judgment rendered against the insured in a third party law-
suit. 152 The court held that such recovery is precluded and 
would violate California's public policy.153 
A. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING VERSUS CAUSATION 
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 154 This covenant 
imposes certain obligations upon insurance companies, in-
cluding the "obligation to accept a reasonable offer of settle-
ment. ,,155 An insurer's failure to meet any of the obligations 
imposed by the covenant is a breach of the covenant and may 
result in tort liability on the part of the insurer.156 Thus, if an 
insurer's breach of the covenant proximately causes injury to 
the insured, the insurer may be liable for any resulting dam-
ages.157 In the instant case, PPG argued that had Trans-
america settled the Miller action, the possibility of a lawsuit 
would have been terminated and, thus, Solaglas' liability for 
punitive damages would have been avoided.158 Consequently, 
PPG contended that Transamerica's failure to settle with 
Miller proximately caused the jury's punitive damages 
d 159 awar . 
In response to PPG's argument, the California Supreme 
Court agreed that Transamerica's failure to settle the Miller 
Respondent Transamerica Insurance Company at 3, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999) (No. 8056618 (1999». 1:;2 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. 
153 See id. at 658. 
154 See id. at 655. 
155 [d. 
156 See id. (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (1988». 
157 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. 
158 S id ee . 
159 See id. 
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action was a cause-in-fact of the punitive damages award.160 
However, the court did not agree that Transamerica's failure to 
settle was a proximate cause of the award.161 In making this 
distinction, the court explained that to prove that a defendant 
caused a plaintiff's injuries, a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injuries 
and that the defendant's conduct proximately caused plaintiff's 
injuries. 162 The court defined a cause-in-fact as "a necessary 
antecedent of an event. ,,163 The court noted that in the instant 
case, Solaglas' intentional misconduct during the windshield 
installation was a cause-in-fact of the punitive damages 
award. l64 However, the court also conceded that PPG would 
not have been exposed to liability for punitive damages had 
Transamerica settled the Miller action. l65 Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that a determination of whether "the defen-
dant's conduct was a necessary antecedent· of the injury does 
not resolve the question of whether the defendant should be 
liable."l66 Rather, in determining proximate cause, public pol-
icy limitations must be imposed in addition to causation stan-
dards.167 The court then went on to discuss three public policy 
considerations which it considered to "militate" against allow-
160 S id ee . 
161 S id ee . 
162 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984». 
163 Id. The court did not further analyze this point. 
164 See id. at 655-66. 
165 S id ee . 
166 
Id. at 656. The court continued, "the consequences of an act go forward to eter-
nity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. 
But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite 
liability for all wrongful acts, and would 'set society on edge and fill the courts with 
endless litigation.'" Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAw OF TORTS, § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting North v. Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012 
(1894». 
167 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 655. The court continued, "Justice Traynor observed, 
proximate cause 'is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of causation, but with the 
various considerations of policy that limit a~ actor's responsibility for the conse-
quences ofhis conduct.'" Id.. (quoting Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372 (1945) 
(Traynor, J., concurring». 
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ing indemnification of punitive damages rendered against an 
insured as a result of its own misconduct. 168 
B. CALIFORNIA'S PuBLIC POLICY 
According to the court, three public policy reasons prohib-
ited indemnification by Transamerica.169 First, liability for in-
tentional misconduct cannot be mitigated by another's negli-
gence.170 Second, punitive damages are intended to punish the 
wrongdoer and to deter such conduct in the future. 171 Third, a 
wrongdoer cannot receive indemnification for punitive dam-
172 
ages. 
1. One's Liability Cannot Be Offset by the Negligence of Another 
The court first considered California's public policy prohib-
iting mitigation of liability for intentional misconduct due to 
another's negligence.173 Relying on both California and Colo-
rado law, the court stated that punitive damages may only be 
awarded where the plaintiff has proven that the defendant in-
tentionally engaged in misconduct to cause injury to the plain-
tiff, or did so "with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety 
of others. ,,174 In the underlying action, punitive damages were 
awarded to Miller based on the jury's determination that Sola-
glas' installation of the windshield was intentional 
168 PPG, 975 P.2d at 656. 
169 S ill ee . 
170 See ill. 
171 See ill. 
172 See id. at 656-57. 
173 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656 (citing 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, 
TORTS § 1057 (9th ed. 1988) and W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAw OF TORTS, §65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984». 
174 PPG, 975 P.2d at 656-57 (citing CAL. CN. CODE § 3294 (a) and (c) (Deering 
1999); Miller v. Solaglas, 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993». The California 
Supreme Court determined that since the rule regarding punitive damages is the 
same in both California and Colorado, "punitive damages awarded under Colorado law 
are equivalent in all relevant respects to punitive damages awarded under California 
law." PPG, 975 P.2d at 656. 
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misconduct. 17& Conversely, PPG's lawsuit against Trans-
america "was based on Transamerica's alleged negligent fail-
ure to settle" the Miller action.176 Thus, PPG's claim against 
Transamerica was not based on Transamerica's bad faith in 
breaching its contract with Solaglas.177 Rather, PPG's claim 
focused on Transamerica's tortious failure to satisfy the duty 
required by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 178 As 
such, the court concluded that the public policy prohibiting the 
offset of liability damages by another's negligence would be 
violated if PPG were allowed to shift its obligation to pay the 
punitive damages awarded against Solaglas to 
Tr . 179 ansamenca. 
2. Punish and Deter By Way of Example 
The court next discussed the public policy of allowing puni-
tive damages for the purposes of punishing the wrongdoer and 
deterring similar conduct in the future. l80 Again, the court was 
reluctant to permit a wrongdoer to shift its liability for inten-
tional misconduct to its insurer.l8l To do so would not only 
pass the insurance company's increased costs to the public, but 
would also defeat the purpose for awarding punitive damages 
against a defendant.182 The court stated that while compensa-
tory damages are awarded to compensate a plaintiff for the 
injuries he sustained, punitive damages are awarded to punish 
and deter.l83 The court concluded that transferring PPG's bur-
17& See id. at 656. 
176 [d. 
177 S id ee . 
178 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656. 
179 S id ee . 
180 See id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999) and Lira v. Shelter Ins. 
Co., 913 P.2d 514, 517 (Colo. 1996». California statute provides that punitive dam-
ages are "damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999). 
181 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 657. 
182 S id ee . 
183 . . See id. The court quoted Peterson v. Supenor Court, 642 P.2d 1305, fn. 4 (Cal. 
1982) (quoting Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 
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den to pay punitive damages to Transamerica would violate 
this public policy. 184 
3. Indemnification of Punitive Damages Prohibited 
Finally, the court addressed whether public policy allows an 
intentional wrongdoer to receive indemnification for punitive 
damages.l85 In concluding that it does not, the court briefly 
explained that the concept of indemnity obligates one party to 
reimburse another party for a sustained 10ss.186 The court ac-
knowledged the possibility that an insurance company's "own 
egregious misconduct may justify an award of punitive dam-
ages against it."ls7 However, it found that there is no justifica-
tion for holding an insurer liable for the insured's 
misconduct. l88 In the Miller action, a Colorado jury awarded 
punitive damages against Solaglas, not Transamerica, for its 
"morally reprehensible behavior in installing the windshield on 
the truck."lS9 The court thus concluded that in this case, re-
440-441 (5th Cir. 1962»: "The policy considerations in a state where, as in [California], 
punitive damages are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem to require 
that the damage rest ultimately as well as nominally on the party actually responsible 
for the wrong. If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance com-
pany, punitive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages are not in-
tended to compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages have 
already made the plaintiff whole .... " ld. 
184 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 657. 
185 See id. (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). The court again noted that 
Colorado "has the same public policy." ld. (citing Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514, 
517 (Colo. 1996». 
188 See id. (quoting Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 
1975»: "Indemnity, which may be express, implied, or equitable, is 'defined as the 
obligation resting on one party to make good a loss or damage another party has in-
curred.''' ld. 
lS7 ld. The court continued: "For example, if in addition to proving a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing proximately causing actual damages, 
the insured proves by clear and convincing evidence that the insurance company itself 
engaged in conduct that is oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, the insured may re-
cover punitive damages from the insurance company ... That issue is not present here." 
ld. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (Deering 1999); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, Ins., 
620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979); and Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 
1974». 
188 . See id. at 658. 
lS9 
PPG. 975 P.2d at 658. 
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Quiring Transamerica to reimburse PPG for the punitive dam-
ages awarded against Solaglas in the Miller action would vio-
late the public policy prohibiting such indemnification. 190 
C. THE MAJORITY'S CONCLUSION 
In keeping with the holdings of the high courts of other 
states, the California Supreme Court held that an insured 
cannot shift its liability for punitive damages arising out of a 
third party lawsuit to its insurance company.191 This holds 
true when such damages are awarded against the insured "as 
a result of the insured's intentional, morally blameworthy be-
havior against the third party.,,192 The court further concluded 
that allowing PPG to recover from Transamerica would violate 
public policy which also prohibits indemnification of punitive 
damages. 193 First, liability for intentional misconduct cannot 
be mitigated by another's negligence. l94 Second, punitive dam-
ages are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar 
conduct in the future. 195 Third, a wrongdoer cannot be indem-
nified for punitive damages. l96 Therefore, the California Su-
preme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment in favor 
of Transamerica. 197 
VI. JUSTICE MosK's DISSENT: THE MAJORITY FAVORS 
INSURERS 
Justice Mosk was the sole dissenter from the majority's 
holding that PPG could not recover the punitive damages 
awarded against it as a result of Transamerica's tortious con-
190 5 'd ee, . 
191 See id. (citing Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1996) and Soto v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y. 1994». 
192 Id. 
193 S id ee . 
194 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 658. 
195 S id ee . 
196 5 'd ee, . 
197 S id ee . 
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duct in failing to settle the Miller action. Instead, Justice 
Mosk argued in favor of a neutral application of the law and 
stood beside the California Civil Code's declaration that there 
is a remedy for every wrong. 198 Justice Mosk began his discus-
sion by stating that in affirming the Court of Appeal's decision, 
the majority not only favored Transamerica over PPG, but also 
"favor[ed] all insurers over all their insureds."I99 
A. GoOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING & THE INSURER'S DUTY TO 
DEFEND 
Justice Mosk first addressed an insurer's duty to defend its 
insured pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.2OO Essentially, an insurance policy is a contract in 
which the insurer "makes promises" to an insured in consid-
eration for insurance premiums paid by the insured.201 The 
terms of such policies impose a duty upon the insurer "to de-
fend its insured against damages for a covered claim by a vic-
tim of the insured.,,202 Should the insured become obligated to 
pay damages for a claim covered by the policy, the insurer also 
has the duty to reimburse, or indemnify, the insured up to the 
amount of coverage specified in the insurance policy.203 Justice 
Mosk agreed with the majority that, as a matter of law, cov-
ered claims against an insured include compensatory damages, 
but generally do not include punitive damages, the purpose of 
which is "to punish the insured itself " for its own 
misconduct.204 However, Justice Mosk recognized that implicit 
198 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 663 (Cal. 1999) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting). 199 
Id. at 658. 
200 
See id. 
201 
Id. 
202 
Id. (citing Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (1997». 
203 . . See PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
204 
Id. (relying on J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 59 
Cal. App. 4th 6, 14 (1997) and CAL. INs. CODE § 533 (Deering 1999). Justice Mosk 
went on to say: "It has been stated: 'The insured's desire to secure the right to calion 
the insurer's superior resources for the defense of ... claims is, in all likelihood, typi-
cally as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as is the wish to obtain 
27
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in both the insurance policy and in the insurer's duty to defend 
is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which 
extends an insurer's duty to defend to include "a duty to make 
reasonable efforts to settle a claim against its insured by the 
insured's victim.205 This obligation complies with California's 
public policy favoring settlement.206 Consequently, in satisfy-
ing its duty to settle a claim, the insurer is obligated to "give at 
least as much weight to its insured's interests as to its own, 
and must act as though it alone would have .to bear any ensu-
.. d t»207 mgJu gmen. 
Next, Justice Mosk asserted that, contrary to the majority's 
argument, there is no prohibition against an insurer offering to 
. settle for an amount that would avoid both compensatory and 
punitive damages.208 If such a rule did exist, insurers would be 
prevented from offering any amount at all for any claim alleg-
ing fraudulent or malicious misconduct that could potentially 
result in punitive damages at trial.209 However, Justice Mosk 
argued that while such claims are simple to allege in a com-
plaint, they may in fact be difficult to prove; thus, one cannot 
"predict with any confidence what any given trier of fact may 
find in the premises. »210 
indemnity for possible liability. As a consequence, California courts have been consis-
tently solicitous ofinsureds' expectations on this score.' This is true when the insured 
is an individual man or woman. It is also true when the insured is a business entity. 
Indeed, the functioning of a free and open market in contemporary society demands no 
less." PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1993». 
205 [d. at 659. See, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1976); Jo-
hansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975); 
and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). 
206 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Coleman v. Gulf Ins. 
Group, 718 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1986) (Bird, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk emphasized that 
"the insurer's duty to settle arises from its interrelated duty to defend." PPG, 975 
P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 
328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
207 
PPG, 975 P.2d at 659 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
208 S id ee . 
209 See id. at 660. Justice Mosk did not explain why or how this would happen. 
210 d ],. 
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Justice Mosk further characterized an insurer's wrongful 
failure to settle a third party claim against its insured as a 
breach of its duty.211 Upon this breach, the insurer has com-
mitted a tort against the insured, thereby making it liable for 
any injuries proximately caused by its misconduct.212 Accord-
ing to Justice Mosk, these injuries can include "any sums that 
[an] insured became legally obligated to pay its victim as dam-
ages for its claim. ,,213 Because indemnification encompasses 
mandatory payment pursuant to the terms of the actual insur-
ance policy, the damages proximately resulting from the in-
surer's failure to settle "do not constitute indemnification.,,214 
Thus, the amount of the insurer's liability for its breach is not 
affected "by any limits on indemnification specified in any li-
ability insurance policy.,,215 Therefore, an insurer that 
breaches its duty to settle a third party claim against its in-
sured is liable to its insured for any resulting damages, namely 
the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that "its 
insured became legally obligated to pay" the third party.216 
Any other result, Justice Mosk concluded, would leave the in-
sured without a complete remedy for the injury suffered due to 
the insurer's misconduct.217 
211 See id. 
212 
See PPG , 975 P.2d at 658 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
213 
Id. at 660. 
214 
Id. Justice Mosk further asserted that "section 2772 of the Civil Code makes 
plain [that indemnification] comprises payment that is required under the terms of a 
liability insurance policy itself. Rather, as the very name declares, they are damages, 
which comprise payment that is compelled by law. The 'principles' that operate here 
are 'fundamental in our jurisprudence.''' Id. (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. 426 
P.2d 173 (1967». "Section 3523 of the Civil Code sets out as a maxim of jurisprudence, 
in the nature of public policy, that 'for every wrong there is a remedy.' Section 3274 of 
the Civil Code implies that the 'remedy' for a tort is generally 'compensation.' For its 
part, section 3281 of the Civil Code implies that compensation for a tort is 'in money, 
which is called damages.' Lastly, section 3333 of the Civil Code states that the 'meas-
ure of damages' for a tort is generally the 'amount which will compensate for all the 
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.m 
Id. 
215 
Id. 
216 
Id. at 661. 
217 
See PPG , 975 P.2d at 661 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
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B. ATTACKING THE MAJORITY'S PROXIMATE CAUSE ARGUMENT 
Justice Mosk next addressed the majority's reliance on the 
negligence-based notion of proximate cause in rendering its 
decision against pPG.21S He noted that while the majority re-
lied on case law which suggests that proximate cause incorpo-
rates public policy considerations, it neglected to mention that 
"such considerations are those that would make it 'unjust to 
hold'the actor 'legally responsible.' ,,219 Justice Mosk concluded 
that no considerations existed in this case that would mak.e it 
unjust to hold Transamerica legally responsible since PPG 
would have no obligation to pay damages in the Miller action 
had Transamerica fulfilled its duty to settle the action in the 
I 220 first pace. 
C. THE MAJORITY'S PuBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS Do NOT "BEAR 
ANY PERSUASIVE FORCE" 
Justice Mosk continued his criticism of the majority's opin-
ion by attacking its reliance on public policy arguments to sup-
port its affirmation of the lower court's opinion against pPG.221 
Before addressing each policy argument, however, Justice 
Mosk began by asserting that none of the policy arguments 
presented by the majority "proves to bear any persuasive 
force. ,,222 
21S 
See id. 
219 Id. Justice Mosk stated that "[the mlljority] quote[s] the observation of then 
Justice Traynor, that proximate cause 'is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of 
causation, but with the various considerations of [public] policy that limit an actor's 
responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.''' Id. (quoting Mosley v. Arden 
Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring». "But they fail to quote 
Witkin's, that such considerations are those that would make it 'wijust to hold' that 
actor 'legally responsible.''' Id. (quoting 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, 
TORTS § 968 (9th ed. 1988». "Considerations of this sort are altogether absent here." 
Id. 
220 
See id. 
221 
See id. 
222 
PPG, 975 P.2d at 661. 
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1. One's Liability Cannot Be Offset by Negligence of Another 
Justice Mosk first addressed the majority's assertion that 
the public policy prohibiting the offset of liability damages by 
another's negligence would be violated if PPG was allowed to 
shift to Transamerica its obligation to pay the punitive dam-
ages awarded against Solaglas.223 Justice Mosk contended that 
such a public policy would not even be implicated, let alone 
violated.224 The public policy at issue does not, as the majority 
claimed, operate "by comparing the relative culpability of the 
defendants in two separate actions.,,225 Rather, the public pol-
icy operates "by comparing the relative culpability of the plain-
tiff and the defendant within a single action. ,,226 Thus, the 
California Civil Code's declaration that there is a remedy for 
every wrong applies to Solaglas' wrong against Miller as well 
as to Transamerica's wrong against Solaglas and pPG.227 
2. Punish and Deter By Way of Example 
Justice Mosk next addressed the majority's contention that 
allowing PPG to transfer to Transamerica its obligation to pay 
punitive damages in the Miller action would violate the public 
policy that allows an award of punitive damages for the pur-
pose of punishing the wrongdoer and deterring similar conduct 
in the future.228 However, Justice Mosk argued that subjecting 
an insurer to such liability for breaching its duties to its in-
sured is not inconsistent with either the deterrence or punish-
223 See id. 
224S id ee . 
225 1d.. Justice Mosk continued, "[F]or example, the culpability of the insured in an 
action brought against it by its victim for bodily injury and property damage vis-a-vis 
the culpability of the insurer in an action brought against it by its insured for tortious 
breach of its duty to settle." 1d. 
226 
1d. Justice Mosk continued, "[F]or example, the culpability of the insured's vic-
tim vis-a-vis the culpability of the insured itself in an action brought by the former 
against the latter for bodily iIijury and property damage." 1d. 227 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 661 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
228 See id. at 661-62. 
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ment aspects of the policy.229 First, Justice Mosk contended 
that there is no conduct to deter since it is implausible that 
PPG or Solaglas would be tempted to engage in wrongful con-
duct in the future hoping that Transamerica might breach its 
duty to settle and therefore become liable to Solaglas or PPG 
for damages.23o Second, any liability imposed on the insurer 
would be limited to "the insured's out-of-pocket costs attribut-
able to the payment of punitive damages" and would not ex-
tend to "various related opportunity and transaction costs. ~1 
Both opportunity and transaction costs tend to be substantial 
since several years often pass between the time an insured 
satisfies its obligation to pay punitive damages and the time 
the insurer actually compensates the insured for the 
payment. 232 Further, transaction costs encompass both the 
"'monetary costs of the litigation' itself' and "'the toll the litiga-
tion takes' on the insured. ,"233 
3. Indemnification of Punitive Damages Prohibited 
Finally, Justice Mosk addressed the majority's contention 
that imposing liability upon an insurer to indemnify the in-
sured for punitive damages is prohibited by the public policy 
forbidding indemnification of punitive damages.234 Justice 
Mosk argued that like the first public policy, the policy against 
indemnification of punitive damages would not be violated be-
cause it would not be implicated.235 Even if the public policy 
was in question, it would not be implicated any more than the 
policy favoring settlement of the underlying third party claim 
by the insurer.236 In this situation, the payment made by the 
insurer does not constitute indemnification since it comprises 
229 See id. at 662. 
230 S id ee . 
231 [d. 
232 See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
233 [d. (quoting Grimm v. Leinart, 705 F.2d 179, 183, n.4 (6th Cir. 1983». 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 
See id. 
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damages compelled by law as opposed to a required payment 
pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy itself.237 In other 
words, compelling such a payment by Transamerica to PPG 
ensures that PPG will be compensated for the loss it incurred 
as a result of Transamerica's breach.238 Thus, just as there is 
no policy prohibiting an insurer from making a settlement 
payment to avoid punitive damages in the first place, there is 
no policy prohibiting an insurer from making payment to the 
insured to "make up for punitive damages" awarded against 
.t 239 1 . 
D. PuBLIC POLICY ACTUALLY FAVORS INSURER LIABILITY FOR 
PuNITIVE DAMAGES 
In contrast to the majority's reasoning that various public 
policy considerations preclude the imposition of liability upon 
an insurer for punitive damages awarded against its insured, 
Justice Mosk argued that "public policies favoring settlement 
and making a wrongdoer remedy its wrong" contradict the 
. majority's conclusion.240 Further, the failure to impose such 
liability upon the insurer invites adverse consequences that 
clearly violate public policy.241 It is well established that an 
insurer has a duty to settle.242 In satisfying this duty, the in-
surer must give, at a minimum, equal weight to its own and its 
insured's interests.243 The insurer must also "act as though it 
alone would have to bear any ensuing judgment.,,244 However, 
knowing that it will not be held liable for any punitive dam-
ages awarded against its insured may compel an insurer to 
breach its duty to settle when a third party claim against its 
insured pleads little compensatory damages, but high punitive 
237 • • See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 
See id. 
242 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
243 See id. 
244 Id. 
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damages.245 Thus, the insurer would be unjustly enriched 
while its insured is left to bear the costs of its insurer's 
breach.246 In essence, "the insurer would receive real premi-
ums in consideration for an empty promise, and would also 
avoid any payment in settlement. "247 As a result, the insured 
would bear both the threat of loss and the actual loss that a 
settlement by the insurer would have prevented.248 
On the other hand, if an insurer can be held liable for puni-
tive damages awarded against its insured, it would be encour-
aged to satisfy its duty to settle since the insurer would stand 
to lose as much as the insured.249 The insurer would thus be 
liable for breach of its duty to settle, adequately providing its 
insured with a remedy.250 Justice Mosk argued that such a re-
sult would not diminish the impact or the purpose of punitive 
damages to punish and deter.251 Rather, as already pointed out 
by Justice Mosk, both punishment and deterrence remain "in 
the form of opportunity and transaction costs. "252 
E. THE DISSENT'S CONCLUSION 
In his dissent, Justice Mosk concluded that the majority 
should have "simply allow[edl the law to operate in a neutral 
fashion."253 An insurer must satisfy its duty to settle regard-
less of whether it is faced with compensatory or punitive dam-
ages.254 Further, just as there is a remedy for the wrong a 
third party suffers as a result of the insured's misconduct, 
there is a remedy for the wrong an insured suffers as a result 
245 
See id. 
246 
See id. at 663. 
247 PPG, 975 P.2d at 663 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
248 . See id. 
249 
See id. 
250 
See id. 
251 See id .. 
252 . . PPG, 975 P.2d at 663 (Mosk., J., dissenting). 
253 Id. 
254 . See ld. 
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of the insurer's misconduct.256 For these reasons, Justice Mosk 
dissented, stating simply that he could not, as did the majority, 
"favor all insurers over their insureds on the issue of punitive 
damages. ,,256 
VII. CRITIQUE: THE MAJORITY IGNORED THE ISSUE 
In ruling against PPG, the California Supreme Court ig-
nored the merits of PPG's arguments. PPG never disputed 
that California's public policy prohibits indemnification by an 
insurer of punitive damages awarded against its insured in a 
third party action.257 Rather, PPG contended that this public 
policy was not applicable to the case at hand.258 PPG argued 
that it was not seeking indemnification from Transamerica for 
the punitive damages awarded against it in the Miller action.259 
Instead, PPG sought recovery for the damages that Trans-
america caused it to suffer in engaging in tortious conduct 
during settlement negotiations.260 At issue, then, was not Cali-
fornia's public policy prohibiting indemnification of punitive 
damages, but rather its public policy recognizing that a tort-
feasor is responsible for damages resulting directly from its 
misconduct.261 In each of their respective decisions, however, 
the trial court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court 
ignored these important policies. 
A. PPG SOUGHT RECOVERY FROM A TORTFEASOR, NOT 
INDEMNIFICATION FROM AN INSURER 
In affirming the Court of Appeal's decision, the California 
Supreme Court relied heavily on its assertion that public policy 
demands that wrongdoers pay for the consequences of their 
266 See id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (Deering 1999». 
266 [d. 
257 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 5. 
258 See id. 
259 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999). 
260 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 4. 
261 S id ee . 
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actions. 262 In doing so, the court effectively relieved Trans-
america of liability for its tortious conduct in failing to settle 
the underlying claim. Both the Court of Appeal and the Su-
preme Court based their decisions on the idea that such a pol-
icy "cannot be undermined by passing the damages on to an 
insurer, even one who has acted unreasonably.,,263 As PPG 
pointed out in its brief, however, forty years of California case 
law suggests the contrary.264 
In California, "an insured should be made whole after an 
insurance carrier breaches its duties towards its insured.,,265 
Upon a breach, the insurer is liable for any resulting conse-
quential damages whether or not the expenses are covered by 
the policy, including such damages as lost profits, medical ex-
penses, and attorneys' fees.266 In this case, Transamerica 
breached its duty to settle by refusing to accept any of Miller's 
settlement offers despite its knowledge that PPG risked suf-
fering a large adverse judgment.267 As a consequence of its 
breach, Transamerica should have been compelled to pay for 
all damages that were the result thereof, including a punitive 
damages award. As PPG noted in its brief, "[Transamerica] 
should pay [for the punitive damages] not because they are 
insured by the policy, but because they were caused by its own 
separate tortious act. Such a result would promote, not in-
fringe upon, California's public policy.,,266 
262 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 656. 
2tI3 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1996). 
264 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 14. 
265 [d. (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 925 (1978». 
266 See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433 (1967) (upholding damages 
awarded to plaintiff for mental suffering resulting from insurer's tortious conduct). 267 . . . See Petitioner's Bnef, supra note 72, at 4. 
266 [d. at 17. 
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B. THE COURT DISREGARDED CALIFORNIA LAw FAVORING THE 
SETTLEMENT OF LAWSUITS 
In its brief to the Supreme Court, PPG clearly stated that 
California case law favors settlements in litigation, especially 
in situations where an insurer tenders the defense of its in-
sured in a third party lawsuit.269 When such a situation arises, 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing mandates 
that an insurer settle a third party action against its insured 
within policy limits when it is likely that a judgment will ex-
ceed the covered amount. 270 When the insurer does not at-
tempt to reasonably settle and an excess judgment is rendered 
against the insured, the excess is a consequence of the in-
surer's wrongful act.271 Thus, the insurer becomes liable in tort 
to the insured for the excess judgment and must pay for all 
damages resulting therefrom. 272 Whether or not the excess 
judgment is covered by the insurance policy or is even insur-
able is irrelevant. The only issue is whether the excess judg-
ment "was a consequence of the insurance carrier's breach of its 
duty to settle.,,273 In this case, it was. 
C. POLICY DOES NOT PRECLUDE SETTLING LAWSUITS THAT 
. INCLUDE PuNITIVE DAMAGES 
Another important point PPG advanced in its brief to the 
court is that "California public policy does not prohibit a party 
from settling a lawsuit that includes punitive damages. ,,274 A 
settlement within policy limits avoids the possibility of an ex-
cess judgment at all, whether or not punitive damages are in-
cluded in the judgment. To contend otherwise suggests that 
269 . See id. at 6. 
270 See supra notes 6 - 70 and accompanying text. 
271 See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 7. 
272 See id. (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429 (1967) and Brandt 
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813 (1985». 
273 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 7. 
274 [d.. at 8. 
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those who settle avoid being punished for their misconduct. As 
the dissent recognized in Lira v. Shelter Insurance Co.r6 
No party suggests that public policy precludes 
the settlement of a punitive damages claim 
that results in insulation of an insured from 
liability for such damages. This being the 
case, when such a settlement is not achieved 
as a consequence of bad faith breach of an in-
surer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
there is no reason that the insurer should not 
bear the consequences of a resulting punitive 
damages award against its insured. Indeed, 
such a result promotes the public policy of en-
couraging good faith and fair dealing by insur-
ers, who control the defense of actions brought 
against their insureds.276 
Here, by breaching its duty to settle, Transamerica became 
the wrongdoer. PPG would not have suffered the excess judg-
ment but for Transamerica's failure to honor its duty. By not 
compelling Transamerica to compensate PPG for the punitive 
damages judgment, the court allowed Transamerica to escape 
liability for its bad faith.277 In the same breath that it con-
demned PPG for its alleged attempt to avoid the consequences 
of its wrongful act, the court permitted Transamerica to do so. 
In so doing, the court gave insurers "no incentive to fulfill their 
obligations to their insureds," but instead gave them the option 
to force insureds to take risky third party cases to trial.276 Cali-
fornia's public policy is certainly not furthered by such an out-
come. 
275 913 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1996). 
276 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 9 (quoting Lira v. Shelter Insurance Co., 913 
P.2d 514, 521 (Colo. 1996». 
277 
See id. at 13. 
278 d [,. 
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D. FORCING AN INSURER TO PAY THE CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES OF ITS WRONGFUL CONDUCT DOES NOT PuT IT IN A 
NO-WIN SITUATION 
Concededly, distinguishing between indemnification for pu-
nitive damages and recovery for consequential damages, as 
suggested by Justice Mosk in his dissent, seems to put the in-
surer in a no-win situation. On one hand, it seems there is no 
harm to the insured if the insurer fails to settle, but no puni-
tive damages are ultimately awarded. In this situation, the 
entire judgment, presuming it is within policy limits, will be 
covered by the policy. On the other hand, if punitive damages, 
which are not usually covered by insurance policies, are ulti-
mately awarded, the insured can recover on the theory that the 
insurer failed to settle. In both circumstances, the insurer be-
comes liable for the entire third party judgment. Thus, upon 
initial review, it seems that the insurer would forever be re-
sponsible for punitive damages awarded against its insured, 
except where there is a settlement demand greater than policy 
limits. 
However, the above scenario incorrectly suggests that, un-
der Justice Mosk's analysis, an insurer that seeks to avoid the 
threat of punitive damages against its insured must essen-
tially settle for any amount within policy limits. Yet, if an in-
surer accepts or attempts to accept a reasonable settlement 
offer of a covered claim in circumstances where a judgment in 
excess of policy limits is likely, it will have fulfilled its duty to 
the insured and would not be liable for damages.279 As PPG 
argued in its brief to the court, when an excess judgment is 
imminent, the possibility of punitive damages does not need to 
be considered in settlement negotiations.280 PPG argued that 
"if Transamerica simply had fulfilled its duties without even 
considering the punitive damage threat against PPG, PPG 
would not have faced a punitive damages judgment. "281 Thus, 
279 
See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958). 
280 
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 72, at 9. 
281 [d. 
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the insurer must simply give at least equal weight to its in-
sured's interests, as the law requires it to do.282 
Furthermore, if an insured is likely to face an excess judg-
ment, whether punitive damages or not, an insurer should 
make all reasonable attempts to settle the claim within policy 
limits.283 The insurer is not authorized to gamble with its in-
sured's money, as Transamerica seems to have done here. An 
insurer should not be able to pursue litigation merely because 
the possible excess judgment includes punitive damages. 2M As 
Justice Mosk noted, the insurer must "act as though it alone 
would have to bear any ensuing judgment."285 Clearly, Trans-
america failed to fulfill this duty when it repeatedly refused to 
settle the Miller lawsuit.288 In fact, Transamerica failed to set-
tle even after a jury found in favor of Miller in the first law-
suit. 287 In so doing, Transamerica breached its duty to settle 
and became liable for any consequential damages arising 
therefrom. The type of damages ultimately incurred is of no 
consequence. Here, PPG suffered a one million dollar punitive 
damages judgment as a result of Transamerica's tortious con-
duct. As such, PPG was entitled to recover. Had Trans-
america demonstrated reasonable attempts to settle the Miller 
action within policy limits, it would have fulfilled its duty to 
PPG. Thus, whether or not settlement negotiations proved 
. successful, any excess judgment incurred by PPG would not 
have been caused by Transameiica. Therefore, any resulting 
judgment would not be classified as consequential damages 
and, thus, would not be recoverable by PPG. 
282 See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 20l. 
283 See WINDT, supra note 1, §5.12, at 324. 
284 
See PPG, 975 P.2d at 662 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
285 [d. 
286 
See supra notes 169 - 190 and accompanying text. 
287 See id. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The California Supreme Court's holding in PPG Industries, 
Inc. v. Transamerica Insurance Co. imposes a tremendous 
hardship on insureds who have been wronged by their insur-
ers. While the court correctly states California's policy against 
indemnification of punitive damages, a fact that PPG conceded 
to in its brief to the court, it incorrectly applied that policy in 
this case. As Justice Mosk acknowledged in his dissenting 
opinion, imposition of damages pursuant to law is not the 
equivalent of indemnification under an insurance policy.288 
PPG was entitled to recover for the damages it suffered as a 
result of Transamerica's breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, regardless of whether the recoverable 
damages were equal in amount to the punitive damages 
awarded in the Miller lawsuit. There is a difference between 
holding an insurer responsible for an insured's liability for pu-
nitive damages and holding an insurer responsible for its own 
wrong. While an insurer indeed should not be forced to bear 
the burden of its insured's wrong, neither should it be allowed 
to escape liability for its own wrong merely because the defin-
ing law is murky. By holding otherwise, the California Su-
preme Court has not only excused insurers from liability for 
their tortious conduct in defending their insureds whenever 
punitive damages are involved, but has also endorsed it. 
Jennifer A Emmaneet 
288 . PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamenca Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 662 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, 
J., dissenting) . 
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